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DEFERRED COMPENSATION-QUALIFIED AND
NONQUALIFIED: A LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVE
THROUGH THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969
Federal income tax statutes are inevitably accommodations to
the stresses of po'werful and often conflicting economic forces. As
a result the statutes are complex, never perfect, always incomplete,
and sometimes even useful and appropriate for the matters in issue.
Those provisions of the 1969 Tax Reform Act relating to deferred
compensation, special H.R. 10 plans, and standard corporate quali-
fied retirement plans, do not constitute exceptions to the general
rule. In some respects they typify the better aspects of the legis-
lative drafting art; in other ways they contain serious drawbacks.
The following article considers the manner in which these de-
ferred compensation and associated provisions reflect the gesta-
tional pressures. It also seeks to evaluate the tendencies of the pro-
visions to enhance or detract from the Internal Revenue Code's
function as a constitutional, rational, and pragmatically adaptable
economic tool.
GERALD H. SHERMAN*
The interests of clarity and orderliness would normally require that
this article begin with a definition of the subject with which it pur-
ports to deal. Following this rule, the commonly understood term, de-
ferred compensation, seems a rather simple matter. Unhappily, the task,
when faced squarely, is a formidable, perhaps impossible, one. Even the
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy had to concede that
his department with its considerable resources has been unable "to de-
velop a satisfactory definition of the term." 1 Accepting the Assistant
Secretary's confession as an accurate prediction of the success others
might have in a similar endeavor, this article begins by merely setting
down the kinds of arrangements which tax practitioners usually view as
deferred compensation. This more manageable task will be accompanied
* B.B.A., 1953, City College of New York; J.D., 1958, Harvard University. Member
of the firm: Silverstein and Mullens, Washington, D.C.
1. Statement of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Edwin S. Cohen, in THE PsI-
DENTS TAx REFoRM PROPOSALS 52 (Comm. Print of the House Ways and Means Comm.,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969).
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by an evaluation of the ways in which the Tax Reform Act of 19692
has attempted to change the rules applicable to these kinds of arrange-
ments.
TYPES OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION
The Internal Revenue Code for many years has maintained a series
of technical rules that have as their purpose the delineation of a type
of compensation for services rendered which receives special and bene-
ficial tax treatment.' Qualified retirement plans, the natural outgrowth
of these rules, constitute one of the most tax-favored forms of deferred
compensation. These plans generally consist of pension and profit shar-
ing arrangements4 by which an employer receives a deduction for con-
tributions to a special fund.' The fund, along with its earnings which
are permitted to accumulate tax free,0 is held for distribution at some
future time (e.g., retirement) to beneficiaries (normally the employees
who earned the compensation by the rendering of service). The bene-
ficiaries are subject to tax on the distributions at the time of receipt.7
The contributions to the fund are not taxable income to the employee at
the time they are made.
The full scope of the tax benefit applies to qualified retirement plans
of corporate employers and noncorporate employers in cases where no
self-employed person is covered under the plan. Somewhat lesser bene-
fits are available in the case of plans to be utilized by noncorporate
entities involving self-employed persons. Here we have the special H.R.
10 or Keogh Act rules.8
In the 1969 Act, no effort was made to amend the H.R. 10 rules.
Rather there was an attempt to equate corporate plans of subchapter S
corporations with the H.R. 10 approach.0 In the case of corporate plans
2. 83 Stat. 487. In bill form, before passage, the Act was identified as H.R. 13270,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 401-07.
4. Stock bonus and annuity plans are also included. Id. §§ 403, 421-25.
5. Id. § 404.
6. Id. § 501(a).
7. Id. §S 402, 403.
8. The rules were passed as Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962,
76 STAT. 809, after more than a decade of consideration by Congress and hard lobbying
efforts by proponents. The Keogh Act takes its name from its prime sponsor, then
Congressman Eugene Keogh of New York.
9. Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. V, § 531(a), 83 Stat. 654 (codified at Izmr. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 1379).
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generally, the 1969 Act purported to make a change only in the area
of the capital gain treatment of lump sum distributions to beneficiaries.10
Over the years, commentators have pointed to the deficiencies in the
conception and operation of corporate plans. The most comprehensive
statement of these deficiencies appears in the 1965 report of the special
President's Committee.11
The 1969 Act did not purport to impose sweeping qualified plan re-
forms. Alternatively, Secretary Cohen indicated that the Treasury was
making a comprehensive study of these plans and that recommendations
to the Congress would soon be forthcoming. 12 These recommendations
are expected during 1970, but have not been released to the public at the
time of this writing.
All funded deferred compensation arrangements do not constitute
qualified retirement plans; however, even a nonqualkfied funded deferred
compensation arrangement may receive beneficial tax treatment, al-
though, the benefits are less than those applicable to qualified arrange-
ments. If carefully constructed a nonqualified funded arrangement,
while it may not result in an immediate tax deduction to the employer
nor in tax free accumulation of the fund's income, can result in the
deferral of the recognition of income by the employee-beneficiary un-
til such time as he receives compensation benefits.3 The 1969 Act makes
substantial changes in the rules applicable to nonqualified funded de-
ferred compensation. This article will examine these changes in detail.
There is a type of deferred compensation which is not supported by
a special funding arrangement but is a reflection of purely contractual
agreements between employer and employee. In effect, the employee
agrees to perform current services for compensation paid, at least in part,
at a future time. No special fund is put aside for him nor is he provided
with rights superior to those of other creditors. There is usually no
reason for the employee's agreement to such an arrangement other than
the desire to reduce taxes. The receipt and recognition of income is
moved from presumably higher bracket earning years to lower bracket
retirement years. Under normally applied rules the employer receives
10. Id. § 515.
11. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE RETIRE-
MENT AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PIVATE PENSION PRoGLAMs (1965).
12. Statement of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Edwin S. Cohen, supra note 1,
at 52-53.
13. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 174. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 404(a) (5)
for rules respecting the employer's deduction.
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a deduction at the time of the payment of the compensation, i.e., at the
same time the employee recognizes income.' 4
A number of policy questions are inevitably raised with respect to
this kind of arrangement. As an initial matter, should the Revenue Code
countenance a deferral of income of this nature solely for the sake of
tax leverage or should there be a requirement for some underlying non-
tax motivation? Lesser questions concern the technical adequacy of the
rules for nonqualified unfunded deferred compensation and the rela-
tionship of those rules to the rules for nonqualified funded deferred
compensation. These issues were raised during the Congressional con-
sideration of the 1969 Act. The answers, however, like the compensa-
tion, were deferred.
It is these kinds of deferred compensation which will be considered in
this article: (1) qualified retirement plans, (2) nonqualified funded
arrangements, and (3) nonqualified unfunded contractual arrangements.
In addition, this study will discuss restricted property which can be
viewed as a form of a nonqualified funded arrangement. Although
there are other kinds of situations which, if one chose, could be included
within the deferred compensation category, they are specifically ex-
cluded here. For example, various kinds of statutory and nonstatutory
stock options can be thought of as deferred compensation.' 5 Similarly,
deferred payments of certain kinds of employee fringe benefits could
come within the scope of the term.' 6 For the purpose here, however,
they will be omitted.
QUALITATIVELY LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS
If one is to evaluate the legislative efforts directed toward deferred
compensation in the 1969 Act he should set standards by which to make
the evaluation. One could establish as many standards as there are minds
engaged in the establishing of such standards. We will eliminate a num-
ber of possible approaches by not making evaluations based on social
policy. We will assume that the policy reasons supporting each of the
provisions under examination here are compelling and will not attempt
to make judgments on the value of those reasons.
We will also put aside issues of revenue raising. Such considerations
14. Id.
15. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 421-25; Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 (1966).
16. E.g., accrued vacation pay. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. IX, § 903, 83 Stat.
711 (amending Technical Amendments Act of 1958, § 97, 72 Stat. 1672).
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are always pertinent to a tax bill. Realistically, however, they are more
in the domains of the economist and politician than the lawyer.
We can then set five standards which, in the view of the author, are
rather commonly applied to tax legislation. Not all of these standards
will be relevant to each provision of the 1969 Act that is examined, but
at least one should be pertinent to every such aspect.
1. The legislation should be constitutional. This usually presents
little difficulty in the case of tax statutes since the courts have been
zealous in upholding their constitutionality against almost all challenges.
In fact, Mertens 17 indicates that in only one instance have the courts
struck down such a statute as unconstitutional. 18 The constitutionality
of at least one facet of deferred compensation will prove to be pertinent,
however, and will be discussed.
2. To the extent possible the language of the statute and the rules
resulting therefrom should be simple and capable of being understood
by as many persons as possible. Such a standard of evaluation is prob-
ably more in the nature of a dream than an attainable, practical goal.
Complexity and tax statutes are seemingly inseparable. George E.
Holmes, in the preface to his 1920 treatise, Federal Income and Profits
Taxes, discussed the imminence of changes in the federal taxing struc-
ture, then only seven years old. 9 He said those changes were imminent
for two reasons, one of which he described in this fashion: "The com-
plexities of the present system involve too much administrative labor
-simplification is necessary if the tax is to be collected promptly and at
low cost. Attention should, and will be, directed towards the solution of
this problem." 20 Fifty years later the same complaints are being made
of our taxing system, with the same sense of moral indignation and with
the same likelihood of success. The search for simplicity, however,
is a worthy one and should not be abandoned. Without simplicity as a
constant goal the Internal Revenue Code would doubtless be even more
incomprehensible and labyrinthian than it is today.
3. Like taxpayers and like situations should be subject to lke rules
of taxation. This standard is, we will all acknowledge, an important one,
but perhaps best understood when viewed in tandem with the next cri-
terion.
4. Rules, the consequences of which are thought to offend commonly
17. J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATrON § 4.01 (rev. ed. 1969).
18. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
19. The sixteenth amendment was ratified in 1913.
20. G. HoLMEs, FEERAL INCOME AN) PROFTS TAXES iii (1920).
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accepted standards of tax equity, should be quarantined, reduced, and,
if possible, eliminated. The late Louis Eisenstein commented on the
problems inherent in making this reconciliation.21 For example, he noted
that Stanley Surrey 22 has talked of provisions that "run counter to our
notions of tax fairness." Eisenstein rightfully questions the employment
of the word "our." 23 Such a Marcusian usage may have the unfortunate
effect of camouflaging the complexities of the problem.
The difficulties posed by these conflicting standards were vividly
demonstrated during the Senate debate on the 1969 Act. Senator Fan-
nin of Arizona introduced an amendment, later approved by the Senate,
for the purpose of deleting from the bill the limitations on the use of
qualified plans by so-called professional service corporations.
Mr. Ribicoff. Under the Fannin proposal, which is now advo-
cated by the Senator from Arizona we would have this tax gim-
mick prevail. It is not illegal. The Treasury Department has ruled
it is proper.
Mr. Gore. Mr. President, the Treasury has lost case after case in
the courts until they say they cannot contest it further.
Mr. Fannin. The Senator is saying that I advocate this. That is
not so. The Senator is stretching the facts.
Mr. Ribicoff. I say the Senator is trying to permit it to remain as
it is at the present time.
Mr. Fannin. Until we have hearings and treat everyone alike.
I am just asking for the same treatment for a professional cor-
poration that is given everyone else, other corporations. I am not
asking for any special privileges.
Mr. Ribicoff. Not special privileges, but I am talking about the
thrust of the Senator's proposal as against the thrust of the com-
mittee proposal and I am comparing them.
Mr. Fannin. The committee proposal is discriminating against one
group.
Mr. Ribicoff. No, I do not think the committee proposal is dis-
criminating against anybody. The committee proposal wants to
21. L. EISNFSrEmN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961).
22. Currently Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School, formerly Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy.
23. L. EisENSlwn, supra note 21, at 194-95.
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plug a loophole before it spreads like wildfire, all through Amer-
ica.24
Senator Fannin is the advocate of equality, the denier of special privi-
leges and the propounder of uniform legislation. Senator Ribicoff is the
intrepid plugger of loopholes. Exchanges of this nature are repeated
throughout the Congressional Record. Each man states his moral posi-
tion and neither man convinces the other. It is not so much a debate
as an exercise in declamation.
The difficulties we will have in reconciling the conflicting standards
can be readily anticipated and, hopefully, sympathetically understood.
5. The statute should be enacted, only after adequate public discus-
sion. This is normally the case with tax legislation of general applica-
bility.25 Hearings before the tax statute writing committees, the House
Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committees, usually provide
adequate opportunity for public discussion.
QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS OF SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS
Self-employed individuals26 may become beneficiaries of qualified
retirement plans. Such plans, however, are subject to a rather lengthy
list of special limitations that are not applicable to plans, normally cor-
porate plans, which do not benefit self-employed individuals. The pri-
mary restriction is the limit, on the annual deductibility of contributions
by a self-employed individual, to the lesser of $2500 or ten percent of
the person's self-employment income.
The Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act28 (more popu-
larly known as H.R. 10 or the Keogh Act) which authorized retirement
benefits for self-employed individuals was intended to "make self-em-
ployment somewhat more attractive, compared to employment with a
corporation, and . . . thus help to keep small business strong and in-
dependent professional practice thriving." 29
Although seemingly not considered by Congress at the time of the
24. 115 CoNG. Rme. S16245 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1969).
25. There are exceptions, of course, for private legislation which sometimes appears
as legislation of general applicability. A prime example of this kind of situation is the
famous or infamous Louis B. Mayer amendment which is described by L. EISENSTEN,
supra note 21, at 156-57.
26. As defined in INT. RaV. CoDE of 1954, § 401(c) (1), (2).
27. Id. § 404(e) (1).
28. 76 STAT. 809 (1962).
29. H.R. REP. No. 378, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961).
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enactment of H.R. 10, both small business and independent professional
practice can often be operated in corporate form.30 Further, the cor-
porate form of operation can be made subject to income tax rules
roughly equivalent to those pertinent to noncorporate operation; i.e.,
by means of the pass-through approach of subchapter S, if elected, the
stockholder-entrepreneur can be taxed directly on the income generated
by the corporate form of the business or profession."1 If this corporate
form of operation can be undertaken, then the entrepreneur, now tech-
nically a corporate employee and no longer self-employed, may be
covered under a normal corporate qualified retirement plan. The plan
and his interest in it will not be subject to the special limitations perti-
nent to the self-employed.
In recognition of this situation, section 531 of the 1969 Act3 2 attempts
to convert subchapter S corporations from the application of normal
corporate qualified retirement plan rules to the application of the H.R.
10 rules.8
Your committee [the House Ways and Means Committee] be-
lieves that if an enterprise wants to incorporate for business pur-
poses but wants to be taxed in a manner similar to a partnership,
then it should be subject to the same H.R. 10 limitations as part-
nerships in the case of the tax treatment of pension plans.8 4
The adequacy of section 531 as a reflection of this legislative purpose
is subject to some question.
As stated above, self-employed persons are faced with an annual limit
on deductible contributions of $2500 or ten percent of self-employed
30. Within the past ten years (for the most part after the passage of H.R. 10) most
states have passed professional service corporation statutes by which professionals, such
as doctors and dentists, may practice in corporate form. See Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-9,
INT. Ray. BULL. No. 13 for a list of those statutes. Only New York, Iowa, Wyoming,
and the District of Columbia do not have such statutes.
31. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1371-78.
32. Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. V, § 531, 83 Stat. 655 (codified at INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 1379).
33. The provision applies only to corporate taxable years beginning after December
31, 1970. Id.
34. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, pt. 1, 91st Cong, 1st Sess. 170 (1969). The Ways and Means
Committee initially placed the problem on its agenda in the following language:
Should the treatment of subchapter S corporations "be modified ... to limit retirement
benefits for employer-shareholders in the same manner as the case of self-employed
persons generally." Ways and Means Committee Press Release of January 29, 1969,
paragraph XIII(5).
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income, whichever is lesser. The 1969 Act's equalizing provision re-
quires that contributions to qualified retirement plans by subchapter S
corporations in excess of that annual limitation for each stockholder-
employee35 will be included in the stockholder-employee's taxable in-
come. 6 This effectively cancels the tax benefit effect, with respect to
the excess of the pass-through deduction under subchapter S. In con-
trast to the strictures of the H.R. 10 rules, however, qualified plans of
subchapter S corporations may continue the tax-free accumulation of
the earnings on the excess contributions.3 Under H.R. 10 rules, such
excess contributions must be distributed to self-employed individuals
who have a ten percent or greater interest in the capital or profits of the
business. 38 As a consequence, the tax-free accumulation possibility on
the excess is eliminated. No explanation is provided for the maintenance
of this distinction which is clearly beneficial to subchapter S corpora-
tions and tends to defeat the equalizing aim of the statute.
Another special H.R. 10 provision relates to the treatment of forfei-
tures. Under H.R. 10 all contributions on behalf of employees must be
fully vested when made if at least one of the participants in the plan is a
self-employed individual who has a ten percent or greater interest in the
capital or profits of the business."9 In effect, there are no opportunities
for forfeitures. In coordination with this approach the 1969 Act pre-
cludes forfeitures for the benefit of stockholder-employees. 40 There is
no restriction, however, on the forfeitures that can benefit employees
other than stockholder-employees. The imperfection of the matching
between H.R. 10 plans and subchapter S plans is, thus, apparent.
After having drawn these close distinctions, the utility of which is
questionable, the 1969 Act does not attempt further to equate H.R. 10
rules and subchapter S rules. The legislative history offers no reason
why the following H.R. 10 provisions, if there is validity to the basic
assumption upon which the 1969's Act's section 531 is premised, should
not be applied to all subchapter S plans:
35. "Stockholder-employee" is defined in the statute as an employee who owns five
percent of the outstanding stock. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1379(d). The ten percent
of self-employed income is changed to ten percent of compensation. Id. § 1379(b)
(1) (A).
36. Id. § 1379(b).
37. Id. See § 501(a).
38. Id. § 401(d) (8). These ten percent self-employed individuals are designated
"owner-employees." Id. § 401 (c) (3).
39. Id. § 401(d) (2) (A).
40. Id. § 1379(a).
[Vol. 11: 870
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1. Required age 70-Y, for distributions.41
2. Requirement of bank or insurance company as trustee.
42
3. Required contribution formula for profit sharing plans.
43
4. Maximum three-year employment requirement.
44
5. No distribution to entrepreneur prior to age 59- /2 .41
6. Limit on excess contributions by the entrepreneur. 46
7. Special coordination of Social Security contributions.47
8. Limitations on the ways in which distributions can be made after
the death of the employee.4
9. Coordination of participation by owner-employee in two or more
unincorporated businesses.49
10. No possibility of capital gain treatment on lump sum distribu-
tions."0
The failure to apply the above limitations to subchapter S situations
constitutes, of course, a failure to treat like situations equally. Conced-
edly, it would not be without merit to argue that the application of such
limitations is not worth the statutory complexity required for imple-
mentation. The basic worth of the limitation might also be questioned.
Furthermore, it could be argued that the participation of a stockholder-
employee in a corporate plan should not cause remaining employee-
participants to be treated differently than employee-participants in other
corporate plans. Of course, the same plea can be made with respect to
nonself-employed participants in H.R. 10 plans.
41. Id. § 401(a) (9).
42. Id. § 401(d) (1).
43. Id. § 401(d) (2) (R).
44. Id. § 401(d) (3).
45. Id. § 401(d) (4) (B).
46. Id. § 401(d) (5), (8), 401(e).
47. Id. § 401(d) (6).
48. Id. § 401(d) (7).
49. Id. §§ 401(d) (9), (10). The failure to coordinate participation by the same
person as a self-employed beneficiary of an H.R. 10 plan and as a stockholder-employee
beneficiary of a subchapter S plan could lead to some abuse where, for example, a
doctor undertakes part of his practice in noncorporate form and part in corporate
form. He might be able to generate $5000 of contribution deductions in one year,
$2500 under each plan. Another alternative would be to be employed by and attain
coverage under the plans of more than one subchapter S corporation.
50. See the text accompanying notes 59-79 infra, respecting the limited availability
of capital gains treatment to recipients of certain lump sum distributions from cor-
porate plans, as contrasted to the complete unavailability of such treatment for non-
corporate plan recipients who are self-employed individuals for H.R. 10 purposes.
Consequently, stockholder-employees may continue to benefit from the capital gain
possibility, whereas no such benefit may accrue for self-employed individuals.
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After simply ignoring this sizable group of intricate limitations, Con-
gress made a special effort to close a statutory breach, the possible use of
which may be more apparent than real. In section 404(a) (3) (A),51
the meaning of which is so obscure that one must rely on the regulations
for an understandable interpretation, 52 a carryforward to future years
is permitted of (1) unused deductions for qualified profit sharing plan
contributions that could have been, but were not, made (i.e., the differ-
ence between the lesser amount deducted each year and the maximum
permissible fifteen percent of compensation deduction) 3 and (2) excess
qualified profit sharing plan contribution deductions (i.e., the difference
between the greater amount contributed each year and the limiting
fifteen percent of compensation deduction)." The possible breach in
the statute concerns the first item, the carryforward of unused deduc-
tions.
Unless the breach is closed, the ten percent of compensation limit for
a stockholder-employee during the years when a subchapter S election
is in effect can be effectively avoided. To wit, in subsequent years when
the subchapter S election is terminated, deductible contributions on be-
half of the stockholder-employee could be fifteen percent of compensa-
tion for those years plus an otherwise nondeductible amount equal to
five percent of the stockholder-employee's compensation for the sub-
chapter S years (fifteen percent minus ten percent of compensation for
those years). This "loophole" is "plugged" by newly enacted section
1379(c).
Given the technical virtuosity with which the statutory mending
was accomplished, one wonders why the carryforward of unused con-
tributions deductions was eliminated for all employees of subchapter S
corporations and not merely stockholder-employees, the only class of
persons who could undesirably benefit from the existence of the carry-
forward. The answer doubtless lies, at least in part, in the fact that the
statute has become so complex that it has, with respect to certain of
its provisions, become the embodiment of uncontrolled technology. It
has become the science fiction robot that assumes command of its human
creator. Given the time limitations within which the 1969 Act was
produced, it may be impossible for a legislative draftsman or a tax tech-
51. IN r. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 404(a) (3) (A).
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-9 (1961).
53. See the second sentence of INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 404(a)(3)(A). The basic
fifteen percent of compensation appears in the first sentence of the section.
54. See the third sentence of id. § 404(a) (3) (A).
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nician, no matter how broad his knowledge or precise his skill, to gen-
erate a complete mastery of the statute's technical features. When this
point is reached, the complex statute is understood by neither the tax-
payer, his tax advisor, nor the examining Revenue Agent. As a conse-
quence, the statute becomes a much simpler and more practical imple-
ment than its intricate structure would warrant. The offending por-
tions of the statute are either ignored or interpreted in practice in a
manner that seems sensible and operable to the people who work with
it. Ignorance of the law may not only be an acceptable excuse in the
case of the Internal Revenue Code, it may be indispensable.
Another provision in the subchapter S tangle illustrates the hatchet
approach to tax equity or "half a loaf is just enough." Under H.R. 10,
the limitation on deductible contributions applies to all self-employed
persons. Most of the more severe restrictions and penalties, however,
apply to owner-employees, i.e., ten percent owners. When the subchap-
ter S amendment was proposed by the Treasury Department under both
Democratic and Republican Administrations,s the limitation on deducti-
ble contributions was intended to apply to a ten percent stockholder-
employee for whom most of the H.R. 10 limitations would have been
pertinent if he were self-employed. It was not intended to apply to a
less than ten percent stockholder-employee. The House Ways and
Means Committee, the full House of Representatives, and the Senate
Finance Committee, however, each without statement of the reason,
propounded an approach by which the deduction limitation was to apply
to a five percent stockholder-employee. 56
Since there is no statement in the record of a supporting reason for
this change, one can only assume that a compromise between zero and
ten percent was being effected. When the bill reached the Senate floor,
however, Senator Mathias of Maryland pointed to the existence of the
ten percent equity test for H.R. 10 purposes and asked that the new
subchapter S limitations be applied only to ten percent stockholder-
employees. 57 Unfortunately, Senator Mathias failed to develop for the
55. The Proposal of the Democratic Administration appeared in U.S. TREASURY
DEPARTMENT, TAX RFoptm STUDIES AND PROposALs 41 (Comm. Print of the Joint
Publication Comm. of the House Ways and Means Comm. and the Senate Finance
Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969). The proposal of the Republican Administration
appeared in Technical Explanation of Treasury Tax Reform Proposals, supra, note 1,
at 304.
56. Although the subchapter S provision was passed as the Tax Reform Act of
1969, tit. V, § 531, 83 Stat. 654, it appeared in H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 541,
when reported by the House Ways and Means Committee.
57. Amend. No. 382, 115 CoNG. REc. S16237-40 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1969).
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Senate the niceties of the distinction between a self-employed person
of any percentage of ownership (including less than ten percent own-
ers), for whom the deduction limitation under H.R. 10 applies, and the
ten percent owner-employee who is burdened with the additional, more
severe restrictions. If he had been more accurate in his description, it is.
conceivable that the Senate would have accepted the Finance Commit-
tee's five percent compromise version, but without the benefit of such
precise explanation, the Senate approved Mr. Mathias' amendment and
sent to Conference a bill which would have applied only to ten percent
stockholder-employees. The Conference Committee promptly, but
without explanation, reset the limitation at five percent. 58
Perhaps new section 1379 will accomplish its purpose of developing
practical parity between H.R. 10 retirement plans and subchapter S re-
tirement plans. If it does, it will not be because the statute clearly de-
velops such an equality; it will be because the simplicity of the concept
has managed to resist the complexity and sometimes capricious effect of
the statute.
LUMp SuM DISTRIBUnON
For many years, commentators59 have been questioning the rule that
permits certain lump sum distributions from qualified retirement plans
to be taxed in the hands of the recipients at capital gain rates.6° Until the
1969 Act, all efforts other than those with respect to H.R. 10, proved
to be unsuccessful. Section 515 of the 1969 Act, which imposes limita-
tions on the permissible capital gain treatment,6' did so only after a sub-
stantial struggle during the legislative process. The bill, as approved
by the House, contained the basic lump sum distribution provisions that
eventually found their way into the final version of the Act. Capital
gain treatment was withdrawn for a substantial portion of such distribu-
58. H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1969).
59. See, e.g., Public Policy and Private Pension Programs, supra note 11.
60. The capital gain approach was initially utilized as a method of ameliorating the
consequences of progressive rates on the receipt in a single year of "bunched income"
that was earned over a number of years. See H.R. REP. No. 91413, supra note 34, at 154.
A lump sum distribution to qualify for capital gain treatment must consist of "the
total distributions payable with respect to any employee" and must be "paid to the
distributee within 1 taxable year of the distribution on account of the employee's death
or other separation from the service, or on account of the death of the employee after
his separation from the service" of the employer. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 402 (a) (2).
See also Id. § 403 (a) (2).
61. Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. V, § 515, 83 Stat. 643-46.
[Vol. 11:870
DEFERRED COMPENSATION
tions.12 The Senate Finance Committee, although it changed certain
computational features, adopted the House version in essence. The
Senate, however, approved Senator Inouye's floor amendment which de-
leted the provision in its entirety." The final chapter of this controversy
was written by the Conference Committee which approved the House
version" 5
Putting aside effective date provisions that clothe section 515 of the
Act with only post-1969 prospective effect," the new rule approves
capital gain treatment for that portion of the lump sum distribution
which reflects the tax free accumulation of earnings in the plan prior
to distribution. The remaining portion of the distribution, in excess of
the employee's basis for his interest in the plan, will be subject to tax at
ordinary income rates after application, with certain limitations, of a
constructive seven-year averaging formula. 7
The averaging formula is formalistically the same as that applicable to
lump sum distributions for self-employed individuals under H.R. 10,
except that a factor of seven is substituted for the H.R. 10 factor of
five."' Basically, one-seventh, or, as described in the statute, 14-2/7 per-
cent of the amount of a lump sum distribution is added to the recipient's
income in the year of receipt and the additional tax resulting from
such additional income is multiplied by seven to arrive at the
total additional tax. Surprisingly, examples can be constructed in
which the additional tax that is computed through use of the formula
will, in the aggregate, be lower than the tax which would have resulted
from application of capital gain rates. The availability of this lesser tax
arises from two factors. First, the rate on capital gains realized by in-
dividuals, in excess of $50,000 annually, can be over thirty percent,
62. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, pt. 1, supra note 34, at 153-56; H.R. REP. No. 91-413, pt.
2, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 111-13 (1969).
63. See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 200-03 (1969).
64. Amend. No. 319, 115 CONG. REc. S16052-56 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1969). The original
"bunched income" concept was prominent among the reasons advanced by Senator
Inouye in support of his amendment.
65. See H.R. REP. No. 91-782, supra note 58, at 318.
66. The provision is effective for taxable years ending after December 31, 1969, and
applies generally only to distributions paid, and for benefits accrued, after December 31,
1969. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. V, § 515(c), 83 STAT. 646 (codified at INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, §§ 402(a) (2), 403(a) (2)).
67. See principally INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 72 (n) (4).
68. See INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 72(n) (2) for the H.R. 10 formula. In lieu of the
specific averaging formulas of § 72 (m) (2), (4), the general income averaging provisions
of the Code may be elected. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1304(b) (2) (amended by
The Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. V, § 515 (c) (4), 83 Stat. 646).
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compared to the prior maximum rate of twenty-five percent.69 Second,
other compensation income received during the year by the recipient
of the lump sum distribution is not taken into account in determining the
ordinary income rate at which one-seventh of the distribution will be
subject to tax, thereby reducing the applicable ordinary income rate.70
Consequently, in some situations the elimination of capital gain treat-
ment in favor of an ordinary income rate formulation will have the
anomalous result of producing a lesser tax for the recipient-employee.
In view of the conflict demonstrated in the legislative history of the
1969 Act, coupled with similar H.R. 10 struggles in prior years, it should
not be unexpected that, with regard to the tax treatment of lump sum
distributions from qualified plans, we have a jumble and an inconsistency
of rules and consequences that rivals and, perhaps, surpasses the sub-
chapter S tangle already discussed. The variations in tax treatment are
manifold. Putting aside differences in variations developed through the
application of effective date rules and the opportunity to elect the gen-
eral income averaging provision of the Code,71 and without attempting
to develop every possible variation, we can isolate five basic kinds of
tax treatment applicable to lump sum distributions. The 1969 Act can
take its share of responsibility for creating or at least breathing life into
a number of these categories. There does not appear to be a sound basis
for these distinctions.
The kinds of tax treatment are:
1. Taxable as capital gain-a distribution 2 with respect to a qualified
69. Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. V, § 511, 83 Star. 635 (codified at INT. REV. CoDE
of 1954, § 1201).
70. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 272 (m) (4) (B). For this purpose, compensation does
not include "deferred compensation within the meaning of section 404." Query,
whether income realized by an employee pursuant to the new restricted property rules,
Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. V, § 321 constitutes deferred compensation for this
purpose? Compare a similar reference in the fifty percent maximum tax on the earned
income provision. Id. § 804 (codified at INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1348), which refer-
ence seemingly attempts to set forth, for purposes of that provision, the particulars
of the relationship between deferred compensation within the meaning of § 404 and
income that is realized pursuant to the new restricted property rules. The clarification
of the issue will doubtless have to await the issuance of regulations.
71. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. V, § 511, 83 Stat. 635 (codified at INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 1201).
72. In each case other than category 3, distribution refers to a qualifying "separation
from service" or "death" lump sum distribution and the amount taxable is computed
after deducting the employee's basis which will consist of (1) contribution amounts
that he, not the employer, has made on his own behalf, plus (2) amounts previously
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plan participant who is not a self-employed individual for H.R. 10 pur-
poses, other than the portion of the distribution which is referable to
the employer's contributions on behalf of the recipient-employee.73
2. Taxable as ordinary income subject to special seven-year averaging
-a distribution with respect to a qualified plan participant who is not a
self-employed individual for H.R. 10 purposes, other than the portion
of the distribution which is subject to tax as capital gain under category
1, if the person to whom the distribution is made has been a participant
in the plan for five or more years.1 4
3. Taxable as ordinary income subject to a special five-year averaging
-a distribution"5 with respect to a qualified plan participant who is a
self-employed individual for H. R. 10 purposes, other than the portion
of the distribution which is subject to the special penalty computations
of category 5, if the person to whom the distribution is made has been a
participant in the plan for five or more years. 76
4. Taxable as ordinary income without amelioration by averaging de-
vices-a distribution with respect to a qualified plan participant, whether
or not he is a self-employed individual for H.R. 10 purposes, other than
those portions of the distribution which are taxable as capital gain under
category 1, or are subject to the special penalty computation of cate-
gory 5, if the person to whom the distribution is made has been a partici-
pant in the plan for less than five years.7 7
5. Taxable as ordinary income subject to special penalty computa-
tions-a distribution to a person who is an owner-employee for H.R. 10
purposes, if the distribution is excessive or is made earlier than permitted
by statute.78
Of the above conglomerate of consequences, the consequence de-
scribed by category 2 is entirely new; the consequence described by
category 1 is a replacement for prior broader capital gain treatment;
and the consequence described by category 4 is an expansion of that
class for the purpose of absorbing a portion of the category 1 treatment
which is not absorbed by category 2.
included in the employee's income. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §1 402 (a) (2), 74(f). In
the case of category 3, distribution refers only to qualifying lump sum distributions if
made after the self-employed individual reaches age 59-Y , dies, or becomes disabled. See
id. § 72(n) (1) (B) (i)-(iv).
73. Id. §§ 402(a) (5), 403 (a) (2) (C).
74. Id. § 72(n) (1), (3), (4).
75. See note 72 supra, particularly the last sentence thereof.
76. INT. Rav. CoDE of 1954, § 72(n) (1), (2), (3).
77. See id. § 72(n) (1) (C).
78. Id. § 72(m) (5), (n) (1) (D).
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In the fifty-year-old words of George Holmes, "The complexities of
the present system involve too much administrative labor-simplification
is necessary . . . .. " Complexity has run rampant and has foreclosed
any attempt to treat like cases in a like manner.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATIONS
As previously noted, H.R. 10 was originally enacted for "small busi-
ness ...and independent professional practice." 80 Section 531 of the
1969 Act was presumably designed to reestablish the application of H.R.
10 to small businesses. Although in some cases the section does reach
professional practice, it is not really responsive to the situation that has
been developing with respect to professional practice over the past ten
years. During this period the states have been enacting professional serv-
ice corporation statutes which enabled professionals, such as physicians,
dentists, engineers, architects, etc., to undertake their practices in cor-
porate form rather than the traditional individual or, at least, noncor-
porate form."' Even without the utilization of subchapter S elections
these professionals, through their corporations, could develop substan-
tial qualified retirement plan benefits far exceeding those available under
H.R. 10.
The first response to this progression of events was the issuance by the
Revenue Service of regulations that exclude professional service corpo-
rations from the definition of corporations for federal income tax pur-
poses. s2 The courts, however, with one very recent and perhaps not
totally germane exception,S were unanimously upholding taxpayers and
permitting the incorporation approach.8s On August 8, 1969, the Rev-
enue Service conceded the battle and agreed that organizations under
state professional association acts would generally be treated as corpora-
tions.85 Up to this point, the issue had generally been thought of as an
79. See G. HoLMEs, supra note 20.
80. H.R. REP. No. 378, supra note 29.
81. See note 30 supra.
82. See Treas. Reg. S 301.7701-2(h) (1965).
83. Jerome J. Roubik, ... T.C.... (1969).
84. See, e.g., Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969); Smith v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1016
(S.D. Fla. 1969); Williams v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 928 (D. Minn. 1969);
Cochran v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Ariz. 1969); Wallace v. United States,
294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1968); Holder v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 160 (NJ.
Ga. 1968); Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 9 at 13.
85. Tech. Inf. Rel. 1019 (Aug. 8, 1969). A more recent and more comprehensive
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administrative or judicial one. It was anticipated that a resolution would
develop primarily through the litigation process. In fact, the Revenue
Service's concession in August occured after the House of Representa-
tives passed the 1969 Act."6 At no point had the subject of professional
service corporations been on the Congressional agenda with respect to
the 1969 Act.
On October 26, 1969, The New York Times published a front page
article, the first sentence of which stated that "[t] housands of physicians
across the country have begun to take advantage of a lucrative tax device
that is saving many of them more than $15,000 a year in taxes." s The
remainder of the article carried forward the tenor of the first sentence.
The Senate Finance Committee immediately responded. Despite the
fact that the professional service corporation issue had not been con-
sidered previously by Congress and not one word of public testimony
had been heard with respect to the issue, the bill, as reported by the
Committee, contained a provision which would have, in general, im-
posed H.R. 10 standards for qualified retirement plans of professional
service corporations."'
The Senate, after extensive debate, adopted Senator Fannin's amend-
ment deleting the Senate Finance Committee's provision. 9 The status of
the law, as it had been developed in the courts, was thus reestablished.
The rejection of the Finance Committee's approach seemed to have been
based primarily on the representation of the Treasury Department that
the entire matter of qualified plans, including those applicable to pro-
fessional service corporations, would be considered in the near future.9 0
Although the argument for equality of treatment among qualified re-
tirement plans for self-employed individuals, subchapter S corporations,
and professional service corporations has appeal it is only appropriate
that those persons who oppose this position should have the opportunity
to present their opposition in public. Given the failure to provide such
a forum, the rejection by Congress of the proposed professional service
statement of the concession is contained in Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 9,
at 13.
86. The House of Representatives passed the bill on August 7, 1969.
87. Blakeslee, Physicians Profit fron Tax Device, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1969, at 1,
col. 5.
88. It appeared as § 901 of the Senate version of H.R. 13270 and would have been
reflected as new § 72 (p) of the INT. REv. CODE of 1954.
89. Amend. 296, 115 CoNG. REC. S16,241-50 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1969).
90. See the letter of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, John S. Nolan,
which was quoted by Senator Tower during the Senate debate, 115 CoNG. REG.
S16,242 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1969).
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corporation reform was not unwarranted. Furthermore, if the Senate
Finance Committee version had been enacted, professional service cor-
porations would have been governed by neither H.R. 10 rules nor the
new subchapter S rules, but would have fallen within a set of standards
entirely their own. For example, whereas under H. R. 10 plans for-
feitures are not permitted for any employee, and under subchapter S
plans forfeitures are not'permitted for stockholders-employees, under
the proposed professional service corporation reform forfeitures would
have been permitted, but the amount referable to stockholder-employees
would have had to have been included in the incomes of such employees.
As a result, the amount of ihe forfeitures would have been permitted to
accumulate tax-free within the fund. This is only one illustration of the
kinds of permutations that would have been developed if the new sec-
tion had been passed.91The action of the Congress in rejecting the amendment appears ap-
propriate in light of the procedural setting in which it arose. It appears
just as appropriate however, that the issue should be considered at length.
Presumably, the Treasury Department will take the lead in presenting
the matter to the Congress for consideration.
RESTRICTED PROPERTY
Although prolixity is one of the means by which tax statutes become
unduly complicated, it is not inevitably an evil to be avoided. In many
cases precision and clear meaning can only be accomplished through the
use of lengthy and detailed language. The kind of complexity that more
seriously plagues tax statutes concerns the multiplication of arbitrary
distinctions among de jure situations having similar de facto qualities.
In the new restricted property rules there is a provision that
requires thousands of words and four pages of the text of the public
law.92 Despite its surface complexity, however, the section tends
'to eliminate capricious distinctions. It applies a single set of tax
consequences to restricted property, whether or not the taxpayer
receives the property under a stock option arrangement, a deferred com-
pensation plan, or some third kind of arrangement involving the per-
91. E.g., under the subchapter S provision there is no coordination of rules if a
'person is a stockholder-employee in more than one corporation; there would have been
such coordination in the case of professional service corporations. In another illustra-
tion, the five percent stock ownership test of the subchapter S provision would not
have been utilized for professional service corporations. In the latter situation, any
,equity owner would have been deemed to be a stockholder-employee.
92. Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. V, § 321, 83 Stat. 588.
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formance of services and the payment of compensation therefor. It
thereby eliminates unnecessary variations in tax consequences that have
been in the law for over twenty-five years.93
The rules respecting the compensatory receipt of restricted property
prior to the passage of the 1969 Act existed in the regulations (and not
directly in the Internal Revenue Code) as a function of the law of non-
statutory stock options.94 The establishment of those rules was, in part,
a response to the Tax Court's Lehman decision. -5 They also reflected
the learnings of other cases including certain Supreme Court decisions.96
In general, under the Regulations, an individual who received property
subject to restrictions having a substantial effect on the property's
value, whether he received that property as a function of a stock option
arrangement 7 or as a direct payment by the employer,9 8 was deemed to
have realized taxable ordinary income at the time the restrictions lapsed.
The amount included in income was the lower of the value of the prop-
erty at the time he received it (computed as if the restrictions did not
then encumber the property) or the value at the time the restrictions
lapsed. 9
Such a rule tends to maximize the capital gain, as contrasted to the
ordinary income, element of restricted property. As a consequence,
shortly before the end of the Johnson Administration, the Treasury
Department issued proposed regulations which would have caused the
recipient to include in income the value of the property at the date
the restrictions lapsed (without any reference to a possible lower value
when the property was first received). The regulations were never
promulgated in final form.10°
The Ways and Means Committee's placement of the restricted property
subject on its agenda can be understood only in the light of this briefly
sketched background. At no point did there appear to be any obvious
93. See Statement of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Edwin S. Cohen, supra note
1, at 60.
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 (1966).
95. Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951), acquiesced in, 1952-1 Cum. BUm. 3, not
acquiesced in, Tech. Inf. Re]. 248 (Aug. 29, 1960).
96. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S.
177 (1945). See TAx MAxAGFAmNT PoRrrolio No. 87-2nd, Stock Options (Nonstatutory)
(1965), for a chronology of the more recent changes in the regulations.
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1966).
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (5) (1966).
99. This value is reduced, of course, by the amount paid by the employee for the
property.
100. Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.421-6(d) (Oct. 26, 1968).
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recognition of the fact that these rules respecting restricted property
were different, perhaps capriciously different, from the rules respecting
deferred compensation, even where the practical distinctions between
the two types of situations were difficult to perceive. Initially, no one
asked whether the establishment of a nonqualified deferred compensa-
tion trust that is funded with contractually nontransferable, but other-
wise traded, stock should be treated differently from the direct receipt
by the employee of the same contractually nontransferrable, but other-
wise traded, stock. Is the employee under one arrangement blessed
with a measurably greater benefit than the employee under the other
arrangement? By the passage of section 321 of the 1969 Act, en-
acting section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code, Congress responded
in the negative and applied the same rule to both situations. 10 1 Like
facts are to be treated in a like way without any recognizable loop-
hole opening and with a decided reduction in statutory complexity.
In net result, a new set of rules has become pertinent for nonqualified
funded deferred compensation.
The general rule, with a series of technical adjustments the analysis
of which would not serve a specific purpose here, 02 is as follows:
The transfer of restricted property to an employee in connection with
the performance of services will cause the market value of that prop-
erty (determined without regard to the restrictions) to be included in
the employee's income at the time the property becomes transferable
or is not subject to a substantial risk or forfeiture." Basically, the ap-
proach attempts to marry the transferability criteria of the prior re-
stricted property rules to the forfeiture criteria previously applicable,
in a less strict form, to funded deferred compensation. 0 4
101. Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. V, § 321(b), enacts changes in INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 402(b), § 403(c) (d), with the effect of applying the restricted property rules
of INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 83 to nonqualified trusts and annuities.
102. The statute considers special problems of restrictions which will never lapse,
holding periods, relationship to tax free exchanges and transitional rules. See Irr. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 83(d), (f), (g), (i). In addition, an election is provided to employees
in certain circumstances to be taxed under a special "non-deferral" rule. See hrr. Rxv.
CODE of 1954, § 83 (b).
103. Such substantial risk exists if the right to the property is conditional on the
performance of substantial future services. Ir. REv. CODE of 1954, § 83(c) (1). This
approach represents a decided tightening of previously applied forfeiture standards
which normally required a lesser commitment by the employee, e.g., simple availability
for consultation.
104. Of noteworthy significance is the statute's solution to the problems of matching
the timing of deduction and income and, more seriously, of losing the deduction
entirely in certain nonqualified plan situations. See id. § 404(a) (5) before amendment
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Although the rule has schematic plausability and tends to improve
the technical quality of the statute, it is subject to one very serious
and perhaps fatal question: Is it constitutional?
Envision a young executive who, like most members of this con-
sumption-oriented society, has little or no accumulated capital. He has
reached a corporate level which entitles him to receive substantial re-
stricted stock, stock which may not be transferred to third persons
for a number of years. Assume that the stock has a market value, with-
out restrictions, of $50,000. Because the employee has vested rights in
the property (within the meaning of the statute),' he must include
the full $50,000 in taxable income. If his marginal tax rate is a modest
forty percent, after adding this $50,000 of income to his base salary,
he will be faced with an additional $20,000 tax liability. His lack of
other capital eliminates one possible source of cash with which to pay
the tax. In addition, because the stock is nontransferable it will not be
possible for the employee to pledge it as security for a loan, the pro-
ceeds of which could be used to pay the tax. Thus, we are presented
with the disturbing sight of a taxpayer who has taxable income but no
income or other resources with which to discharge the statutorily im-
posed tax obligation. In addition, under the 1969 Act his failure to
pay the tax with the filing of his tax return could conceivably result
in the imposition of a penalty equal to twenty-five percent of the tax
underpayment, i.e., another $5000.'06
Clearly the above hypothetical brings into question the wisdom
of the restricted property rule that was finally adopted. More to the
point for our purposes, it challenges the constitutionality of the ap-
proach. Although tax statutes are rarely held to be unconstitutional and,
in addition, there is little reliable learning on the outer constitutional
dimensions of the term "net income," the new restricted property rule
appears to stretch those dimensions to the breaking point.
If the Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert'07 definition of in-
come as "gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both com-
by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. V, § 321(b) (3), 83 Star. 591; Mississippi River
Fuel Corp. v. Kohler, 266 F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959);
Russell Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 159 (Ct. CI. 1959). With the
enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. V, § 321(b) (3), 83 Star. 591 the deduc-
tion will be taken by the employer at the same time the employee realizes income. See
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 83(h), 404(a) (5).
105. It is not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
106. Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. V, § 943; INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6651.
107. 231 U.S. 399,415 (1913).
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bined . . ." is used as a starting point, we are dealing with an item
which, if it is income, seems to be gain derived from labor. But is there
gain? Although the courts recently have been rather liberal in ac-
celerating the recognition of taxable income, they have invariably dealt
with situations in which the taxpayer is in possession of property that
is cash or does not suffer from legal restrictions on its convertibility
into cash.108
Our normal accrual tax accounting concepts would cause an item
to be "includible in gross income when all the events have occurred
which fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof
can be determined with reasonable accuracy." 109 Section 83 transcends
the accrual concept since any reasonably accurate valuation approach
at the time of receipt of the property would have to take into account
a discount factor for the restrictions. At this time it is not possible
to judge accurately the value the property will have when the restric-
tions lapse. By the time the restrictions lapse the property may be
worthless. The employee may never, in any meaningful way, receive
the income which the statute credits him with having realized.""
Section 83 establishes a fictional income which may or may not re-
flect the income actually received when the restrictions lapse. As-
suredly, the determination of an appropriate rule here is a very dif-
ficult task and the rule reflected in section 83 has a number of virtues,
some of which have been considered herein. The difficulty of the un-
dertaking; however, cannot be accepted as an excuse for the creation
of a consequence that is probably unconstitutional.
NONFUNDED CONTRACTUAL PROMISE
We have previously stated that the rules respecting funded, non-
qualified deferred compensation and those concerning restricted prop-
erty should ideally be the same; and, in fact, section 321 of the 1969
Act attempts to accomplish just such an equalizing feat. That section,
however, fails to account for nonfunded deferred compensation. So
108. See, e.g., Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); American Automobile
Association v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1969).
109. Treas. Reg. S 1.451-1(a) (1969).
110. Further, if we look to the time rule with respect to the sale or exchange of
property, we find that the amount realized in such an event consists of cash plus the
fair market value of property received in exchange. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1001.
The fair market value of property that is subject to restrictions is clearly not the
same as the value of that property without restrictions.
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long as this latter kind of deferred compensation is governed by a
separate set of rules which cannot be reconciled with the section 321
approach, the statute will have a basic deficiency. The distinction be-
tween funding and nonfunding is simply too weak a fulcrum on which
to pivot the difference in tax treatment. As described above, the re-
ceipt of an interest in a separate trust that is funded with nontransfer-
able stock should be treated no differently than the direct receipt of
such nontransferable stock. Similarly, a nonassignable promise from
General Motors or any corporate or noncorporate person, as the em-
ployer, to make a payment in the future, even possibly measured by
the market movement of General Motors stock, should be generally
governed by the same tax rules as those applicable to funded arrange-
ments.
The 1969 Act made no change in the existing rules respecting non-
funded deferred compensation. As a consequence, now, as for a num-
ber of years past, the tax treatment of nonfunded deferred compen-
sation is governed primarily by Revenue Ruling 60-31." In essence,
the timing and the amount of the recognition of taxable income in a
nonfunded deferred compensation arrangement is dependent on the
application of the esoteric constructive receipt and economic benefit
concepts.112 Attempts have been made to analyze Revenue Ruling 60-
31 in terms of those theories.113 The analyses are not always illustrations
of precision and clarity, however, not because the attempts are inept
or inadequate, but because the subject matter, particularly the economic
benefit theory, defies clarity.
Revenue Ruling 60-31 could, with allowances for imprecision, be
described as stating in general that an item paid in return for the
performance of services is included in the employee's income when he
receives or constructively receives it or when it is received by a third
person, such as a trustee, for the nonforfeitable economic benefit of
the employee.
Although the 1969 Act, as passed, did not contain a specific provi-
111. 1960-1 Cum. Bun. 174.
112. The constructive receipt theory addresses itself to the timing of income rather
than to the question of what constitutes income. "Income although not actually reduced
to a taxpayer's possession is constructively received by him in the taxable year during
which it is credited to his account, or set apart for him, so that he may draw upon it
at any time. . . ." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1964). The economic benefit theory
attemps to isolate the types of noncash property and rights which may be received
as income. See, e.g, id. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (1966); § 1.446-1(a)(3) (1961).
113. See, e.g., TAx MA-AGEmENT PoRTFoLTo No. 20-3rd, Deferred Compensation Ar-
rangements (1969).
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sion that was directed to the question of nonfunded deferred compen-
sation, the matter was considered by the Congress during the develop-
ment of the Act. The House Ways and Means Committee proposed a
rule which was adopted by the House," 4 but deleted by the Senate."'
Under this proposal, nonfunded deferred compensation would have
been included in income at the time of its receipt, but at the tax rates
(determined through a special computation) which were applicable
at the time it was earned.
The Ways and Means Committee supported its suggested change
by noting""e that: (1) the current difference in tax treatment between
funded and unfunded arrangements does not have a sound basis; (2)
the availability on a discriminatory basis, to only selected employees,
of the deferred compensation tax rate reduction benefit is inequitable;
and (3) the new fifty percent earned income tax rate limitation re-
duces the need for special deferred compensation tax rules.""
The choice of approach selected by the Committee is difficult to
understand in view of the reasons set forth for its adoption. There
was no attempt to equate the tax treatment of funded and nonfunded
114. It appeared as § 331 of the House version of H.R. 13270 and would have been
reflected as new § 1354 of the INT. REv. CODE of 1954.
115. See S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 63, at 306.
116. It is anomalous that the tax treatment of deferred compensation should
depend on whether the amount to be deferred is placed in a trust or
whether it is merely accumulated as a reserve on the books of the
employer corporation. An employee who receives additional com-
pensation in the form of a promise to pay him that compensation in
the future made by a large, financially sound corporation, is probably as
likely to receive the compensation as an employee whose deferred com-
pensation is placed in trust. Your committee believes that the possibility of
shifting income to taxable years after retirement when the marginal tax
bracket is expected to be lower should not be available to employees who
are in a position to bargain for deferred compensation arrangements and
to rely on the unsecured obligation of their employers, when such benefits
are not available to other employees. Your committee believes that the
50 percent limitation on the marginal tax rates applicable to earned income
contained in its bill is a further reason for the adoption of this provision.
H.R. REP. No. 91-413, supra note 34, at 70.
117. Tax Reform Act of 1969, tit. VIII, § 804, 83 Stat. 685 (codified at INr. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 1348) provides, in general, that compensation income will not be taxed
at a rate higher than fifty percent. Thus, whereas formerly deferral of compensation
income to a lower bracket retirement year could result in a maximum rate reduction
equal to the difference between seventy percent and the retirement year's tax bracket,
that reduction will now be no greater than the difference between fifty percent and
the retirement year's tax bracket. In effect, there has been an elimination of a maximum
possible benefit equal to twenty tax rate points previously accruable through the use
of deferred compensation.
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deferred compensation, nor was a discrimination standard proposed. Al-
though we can only conjecture, the existence of this gap between
cause and effect may have played a part in leading the Senate to delete
the proposal. Of course, the Senate could have made the deletion with
full knowledge that the Treasury favored such action and had promised
to undertake a comprehensive study of the problem.118
The approach of the Ways and Means Committee appears to make
little sense in view of the new rules for funded deferred compensation.
The same lack of rational base, however, can be assigned to continua-
tion of the Revenue Ruling 60-31 approach. It is not the Senate's ac-
tion in deleting the provision which should be called into question; it
is rather the failure of Congress to provide uniform rules respecting
all deferred compensation. We assume, of course, that very shortly
the Treasury will assist Congress in correcting the omission.
CONCLUSION
The 1969 Act's handling of deferred compensation suffers from a
common ill of tax legislation. The statute's catalytic motivations are
described in terms of broad and symmetrical reformations intended to
bring into harmony the various parts of the whole. Such motivations,
however, typically miss their mark and merely spawn interstitial solu-
tions to exceedingly narrow problems. The celestial reach of the re-
former stands aside for the limited grasp of the legislative draftsman
who has much the more difficult task. The "patchwork" or "crazy-
118. The Treasury Department recommended that this provision be deleted
from the bill. The Treasury indicated that further analysis was necessary
to determine whether the proposed solution was consistent with the cash
basis of accounting and whether alternative solutions were available. The
Treasury also indicated there are a number of problems in the practical
operation of the provision which it believed had not been solved satis-
factorily. Among these are the scope of the term "deferred compensa-
tion," and the determination of the year in which deferred compensation
is deemed to have been earned. The Treasury Department has undertaken
a comprehensive study of both qualified and nonqualified employee benefit
plans, and it intends, as part of this study, to develop recommendations
dealing with the tax consequences of all deferred compensation arrange-
ments.
The committee agrees with the concern of the House in this regard, but
believes that the administrative difficulties associated with the House pro-
vision make further study desirable. The committee has, therefore, de-
leted this provision from the bill pending further study by the Treasury
Department. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 63 at 307.
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quilt" patterns of the 1969 Act's deferred compensation provisions are,
therefore, not surprising or unique.
Fortunately, in contrast to much of our past tax enactment, there
may be a greater reason to believe that a more permanent and work-
able solution will eventually emerge from the taxing efforts of 1969.
The Treasury has committed itself to develop and put before Congress
a comprehensive and logically interrelated income tax system for de-
ferred compensation. Hopefully, the long and passionately sought an-
swers will be found.
